Physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia - a response by Landman, Willem A
generalisations but short on specifics, Landman reveals a
lack of understanding of the therapeutic alternatives,
particularly in relation to pain relief and the terminally ill. It is
implied that the only alternatives in this situation are
sedation to the point of death or euthanasia. There have
been major advances in the treatment of pain in the
terminally ill that offer these patients adequate analgesia
with retention of the capacity to relate to those around them.
Euthanasia is the ultimate form of therapeutic nihilism in this
situation, and it would be a more positive use of resources
to concentrate on the provision of adequate pain relief rather
than the easier option of euthanasia. It is worth noting that
managed health care providers in the USA, who are
sometimes less than willing to fund useful treatment, have
expressed willingness to pay for euthanasia.' Their motives
are obvious. The combination of poor ethics and profit
incentives leads to bad medicine.
Landman suggests that it would not be responsible to
euthanase a young person with a family because of
depression; does he then imply that it would be reponsible
in an older person with no family responsibilities? I have
recently experienced just such an episode in an elderly
relative who might have taken that option at the lowest point
of his depression. I am relieved that his physicians
persevered with his treatment, and after a long and
emotionally draining time he has returned to his life. In
Landman's brave new world he might not have, my children
would have been deprived of a grandparent, and he would
have been robbed of the rest of a productive life.
The issue of what are termed dehumanising diseases,
such as Alzheimer's disease or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
is a complex area. Landman implies that an intact peripheral
or central nervous system is essential to the definition of
humanity; this seems to me to be highly restrictive, and
excludes from humanity an uncomfortably large group of
people. Is Down syndrome a dehumanising disease, for
example? These diseases present almost insurmountable
problems in the area of consent if patients' autonomy is the
central issue and they cannot communicate, who will speak
for them?
Landman states that in a multicultural democracy, a
particular group has no right to impose its views on another.
There is broad agreement among all groups in this country
that killing is not acceptable. It is not even necessary to
invoke God in this debate, as an atheist with any moral
sense will support this position. This country has a bitter
history of not assigning sufficient value to the lives of others.
If we are to have any hope of breaking free from this history,
we need to resist anything that further devalues life. The
constitutional court articulated this in its decision on the
death penalty, stating that no murderer is so without value
that he deserves death.
Landman accepts that poor judgement and error could
lead to problems, having attempted to suggest that the
documented cases in Holland where patients have been
euthanased without consent, and at least one case with an
expressed refusal, do not represent a major difficulty with
his argument. One single death without consent represents a
major problem to me; if the statement 'I needed the bed'
does not chill him, it should.' Landman has a faith in
undefined guidelines, safeguards and monitoring that would
be touching if it were not so out of touch with reality. These
were all in place when Steve Biko was arrested; the
collusion of ethically deficient doctors and a coercive state
led to consequences that are not yet resolved. I hope that
we do not have to repeat the experience. The ethically
challenged and politically correct should not define how we
practise now, as the State and the ethically defective should
not have then. The only thing that stands between us and
thousands of cases like Biko's is an agreement on time-
honoured ethical principles that does not allow us
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I wish to thank Dr Hampton' for contributing to an important
public debate on physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and
voluntary euthanasia (hereafter 'euthanasia') by responding
to my editorial.' He voices an important concern, shared by
many people, about the slippery slope, namely that well-
intentioned legalisation of PAS and euthanasia would lead to
wrongful killing of the vulnerable. The Editor of the SAMJ
must be congratulated on making space available in his
columns for this purpose.
I claim that the moral case for legalisation of PAS and
euthanasia is more 'compelling' (p. 8682) than the
alternative. If that is what Hampton means by my
'attempting to seize the moral high ground',' then I concur.
That Hampton and others are not persuaded is not
surprising, since a conclusive argument in heavily value-
laden issues such as these is not always possible. The
fundamental question is this: which position best accounts
for both patient autonomy and patient well-being (best
interest)? I think a pro-PAS and euthanasia view does, but I
take opposing arguments very seriously. Legalising PAS and
euthanasia would take important decisions about terminal
illness and enduring unbearable suffering (induced by pain
or distress) out of the twilight zone of guilt and fear of
criminal prosecution, creating the space for taking these
decisions in a compassionate and dignified manner.
My argument is crucially dependent on the recognition of
the primacy of patient autonomy or self-determination.
Autonomy requires informed consent, which is given by an
individual competent to choose for PAS or euthanasia, and
whose choice is both voluntary (free from coercion or undue
influence) and based on adequate information (about
matters such as diagnosis, prognosis, and effectiveness of
pain management).3 Given this autonomy requirement, it is
regrettable that Hampton invokes examples that would not
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be condoned by my analysis. Let me spell it out: if anyone
with Down syndrome, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
Alzheimer's disease, clinical depression or any other disease
does not meet the requirements of informed consent, PAS
and euthanasia would not be ethically permissible. (An
advance directive which makes provision for conditions
brought on by, for example, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or
Alzheimer's disease may meet the requirements of informed
consent once the patient is no longer competent.) Likewise,
by no stretch of the imagination could 'I needed the bed' be
grounds for euthanasia.
Hampton makes much of non-maleficence (doing no
harm), but some might find his position excessively
paternalistic, assuming that others know better what
constitutes a harm for me. There may be tragic situations in
which from the patient's perspective death no longer
constitutes a harm, but rather a benefit. Note that autonomy
and non-maleficence are linked: when patients
autonomously request PAS or euthanasia, they freely decide
what is a harm to them, even though, tragically, that may be
continued life. In short, Hampton's view that non-
maleficence, as judged by others on behalf of the patient,
has blanket primacy over autonomy opens the door for
paternalism that may be both oppressive and cruel. Nothing
in my analysis undermines the basic imperative not to harm;
on the contrary, I contend that overzealous insistence on
continued life may constitute a greater harm.
Where there is inadequate public health care to protect
the vulnerable, one must be especially vigilant so that what
becomes legal is carefully circumscribed and governed by
stringent procedural guidelines. Hampton justifiably
demands that I spell out such guidelines, a task for a
separate publication. They would relate to determinations
such as the following: whether the patient has a terminal
illness or endures unbearable suffering; whether a decision
is neither coerced nor unduly influenced by third parties;
whether a choice is based on all the relevant information;
whether there have been two separate requests with time in
between for adequate reflection, consultation with family
and friends ('assisted suicide' may be a more accurate term·
than 'PAS') and counselling; and whether two physicians
have independently certified these determinations. I would
not routinely involve the courts in these determinations. For
me, too, one single death without consent would be one too
many. But to imply that the present status quo alternative is
free from abuse is simply not true. And there would have
been even more misery if compassionate physicians did not
already do what is illegal.
It is sad, indeed paradoxical, to link my support for PAS
and euthanasia, grounded in both autonomy and well-being,
and underpinned by stringent procedural guidelines, with the
Biko killing. PAS and euthanasia, properly administered, are
modes of ending life filled with compassion and regard for
human life which is terminal or made unbearable by
enduring suffering (as in the moving case of Diane presented
by Quill'). Biko requested neither PAS nor euthanasia but
died in the most brutal circumstances while detained against
his will. If I am correct in understanding that Hampton
honestly believes that, were PAS and euthanasia legalised
tomorrow, they would hasten the death of at least a
thousand patients in circumstances of unspeakable cruelty, I
too share his concern for the future of medicine in South
Africa. Finally, it seems to cheapen the rhetorical and
historical power of the Biko killing, an incident that should
inspire moral outrage, by equating it to an issue, like PAS or
euthanasia, upon which reasonable people of good will can
and do disagree. (As a student leader in the early 1970s, I
met with Biko when it was still frowned upon to do so. In the
month he died I publicly objected to the government's
complicity in his death. For these personal reasons, too, I
find the linkage between Biko's death and my argument
unfortunate.)
Hampton is wrong to see pain-relief care, on the one
hand, and PAS and euthanasia, on the other, as mutually
exclusive. In my analysis I stress the crucial importance of
hospice care, pain relief and palliative care as a constant
background condition. However, it is a fact that there is
suffering, induced by pain or distress or both, that is
unmanageable, and I do not think physicians should be
placed in a position where they are prohibited by law from
acting in their patients' best interest. I am unfamiliar with any
published medical literature on the willingness of managed
care providers to fund euthanasia. However, if such
practices are both ethical and subject to rigorously applied
guidelines, then it would be no worse to profit from them
than from funerals or cremations.
Hampton claims that the majority of South Africans
consider killing unacceptable, adding that the Constitutional
Court attaches such value to human life that it proscribes
putting a murderer to death. Apart from newspaper reports
that many South Africans support the death penalty, a
number of constitutional rights would seem to support the
constitutionality of PAS and euthanasia, rendering
Hampton's implied analogy with the death penalty invalid. A
submission to the Law Commission suggests' ... that
forbidding such practices [PAS and euthanasia] would be
unconstitutional on the grounds that it would violate the right
"to freedom and security of the person", and specifically the
rights "not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without
just cause" and "to ... control over their body". Moreover,
on a technical point, the Constitution speaks of a right to
life, but not of a duty to live. Given their conceptual logic,
rights may be waived. If continued life is no longer in
somebody's interest, that person should be free to waive
that right to life. '5
Willem A Landman
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